
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NSC BRIEFING

12 October 1953

REACTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT
ON TRIESTE

Tito attempts to disrupt Anglo-American plan for Trieste.

His diplomatic moves include a call for a four-power conference (US-UK-Italy-Yugoslavia) and a note to the United Nations informing it that Trieste situation is threat to the peace.

His military gestures include:

- 1. Despatch of yet undetermined number of troops to Zone B to reinforce approximately 4,000-man Yugoslay garrison there;
- 2. Cancellation of all military leaves
- 3. Warning that Yugoslav troops will enter Zone A "the moment" Italian troops enter.

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a clash with US-UK forces in Zone A.

His most recent diplomatic moves suggest that the military measures are intended to halt implementation of US-UK withdrawal from Zone A and bolster his internal and international position:

- He probably expects thus to delay implementation of US-UK plan;
- 2. He has strengthened his position at home where nationalism is strong.

Italian government reaction favorable:

Italian government has announced that *cision is another important step to advance problem towards "just and definitive solution."

- It has publicly stated that decision does not prejudice rights of Italy to entire territory;
- 2. Premier Pella has promised US-UK
 ambassadors to do what he can to maintain atmosphere of calm.

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with the exception of the Social Communist and monarchist press, public has responded favorably.

SOVIET POSITION ON TRIESTE

Soviet press reaction to Trieste decision:

Soviet press has printed without comment
Washington and Rome Tass despatches stating
that Anglo-American decision on Trieste ignores
the solution prescribed by the peace treaty.

These despatches note that Italians are not giving up pretentions to all of Trieste territory.

Ambassador Bohlen believes that Soviet failure to print the Belgrade despatch giving Yugoslav reaction represents an effort to avoid appearing to support the Yugoslav position which may coincide with the position USSR may take.

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Communist reaction:

Togliatti, who recently came out in favor of a plebiscite, denounces US and British regard for Italian interests. He warns that "tense situation will be used to tie Italy more closely to the Atlantic imperialist camp."

Satellite propaganda points out the "great consternation" in Italy as well as alleging that the Western powers complied with Italian demands in order to gain Italian acceptance of EDC.

A Cominform broadcast from Prague notes

i positive, aspect of the decision in the

promised termination of Anglo-American occupation which will test the sincerity of Italy's

"so-called Allies."

Probable Soviet moves

Maintain its position in support of the Italian peace treaty.

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- 1. Since 1947, the USSR has consistently paid lip service to this plan calling for a free territory of Traeste with a governor appointed by the Security Council.
- 2. As late as 20 September, <u>Izvestia</u> article maintained that the Italian peace treaty outlines the correct solution.
- 3. This position enables the Soviet
 Union to maintain the pose of upholding peace treaties and wartime
 agreements--regardless of how unworkable they may be in such cases
 as Trieste.

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ing that of the Yugoslav government,
would raise suspicions in Allied
quarters regarding Soviet-Yugoslav
relations.